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Corporate Governance and First-Best Solutions: A Sociological 
Perspective 
Aviv Pichhadze 
Abstract: 
Drawing on insights from social science methodology and systems analysis, the 
article adopts a holistic view of the equity markets and highlights how market 
forces have been driving the evolution in the equity markets towards a first-best 
corporate governance model. This governance model is the Market Oriented 
Blockholder Model (MOBM). The analysis shows that the process is not yet 
complete given that the legal framework has not yet updated its foundation to 
fully accommodate the MOBM. Such a failure by policy makers creates an 
opportunity for the introduction, into the financial system, of regulatory systemic 
risk – long-term imbalances introduced into the regulatory framework by 
regulators via regulatory initiatives premised on a distorted understanding of 
market realities. This is illustrated using the example of the treatment of 
institutional investors by market participants and regulators. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing quest for a first-best corporate governance framework appears to be a difficult 
task.  As expressed by Bratton and McCahery (2002, p. 47), “[p]olitics can indeed explain 
why a governance system has not evolved so as to be first best.  But it cannot by itself show 
us how to improve that system.  For that one needs an economic theory of the firm.  No 
economic theory yet articulated shows us how to splice blockholder components onto market 
systems so as to effect material improvements.” Is a first-best framework simply unattainable, 
or has the quest been misguided?  This article will suggest that the first-best governance 
system is discoverable and, in fact, is actively being unfolded.  To identify this, however, one 
needs to turn to, and understand, the dynamics within the equity markets.  These dynamics 
can be understood and described through the application of sociological methodology. 
This analytical exercise is both timely and important as policymakers around the 
globe are looking to fundamentally reform the global financial system and its various 
components (OECD 1 2009). These reform initiatives, which are pursued with the view of 
correcting failures that led to the present economic crisis in a co-ordinated and harmonized 
manner, cover various levels and components of the financial markets and include such 
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things as transparency, risk management, supervision, regulation, and corporate governance 
(OECD 2 2009).  This article is concerned with the last area of proposed reforms – corporate 
governance. 
Harmonization efforts in the area of corporate governance mean that differences 
resulting from geographic boundaries are lowered in the pursuit of a common goal. Yet, if we 
are to base our reform efforts on the widely discussed models available in the literature, we 
run into the familiar problem that has faced policymakers in the area for many years. This 
was explained by Wymeersch (2002, p. 240), “ownership structure seems the single most 
significant variable factor in explaining differences in governance structures.”1 This poses a 
hurdle to harmonization efforts given that corporate ownership structures considerably affect 
many key governance mechanisms (Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009). 
Yet, as Pichhadze (2010, pp. 85-86) argued recently, this hurdle is diminishing. This 
is because we see evidence of global economies moving closer in terms of ownership 
structures or, stated differently, there is evidence of an emerging global convergence vis-à-vis 
ownership structures at the level of the markets. This convergence is towards what Pichhadze 
(2010) referred to as the Market Oriented Blockholder Model (MOBM). 
The MOBM is a hybrid ownership structure towards which the US capital markets 
have been gravitating over the 20th century. The principal feature of the MOBM is its 
blockholder levels of corporate public ownership, which work harmoniously with market 
mechanisms (such as takeover activity) to achieve improved monitoring of corporate 
management along with the development of efficient and liquid markets. As such, the 
MOBM brings the US closer to the majority of the world’s economies that display block 
holdings. In the US, the emergent blockholder is the institutional investors. 
Diminishing, however, does not mean complete removal of the hurdle.  This is the 
result of the distorted view in the literature on corporate governance, or the working 
hypothesis, which holds that the ownership pattern in the US can be characterized as 
fragmented (Pichhadze 2010, pp. 71-72). This working hypothesis also resonates within 
regulatory circles and, consequently, affects the regulatory framework of the capital markets. 
Accordingly, a situation is created whereby regulatory initiatives that are based on a distorted 
understanding of the realities in the capital markets affect the overall regulatory framework of 
these markets to the extent that imbalances are introduced into the regulatory framework – 
imbalances that may result in regulatory systemic risk.2 
In order to explore the above issues, the analysis adopts Durkheim’s (1997) approach 
and examines the equity markets sui generis – that is, the article takes a holistic view of the 
capital markets. This type of undertaking is ambitious given the complex nature of the capital 
markets. Despite this challenge, the exercise is valuable given that it yields results and insight 
not attained by other modes of analysis.  
Part 2 provides a brief overview of systems analysis and introduces the homeostatic 
and autopoietic processes, as well as, provides examples of their application. Part 3 applies 
1 See also statement by Claessens (2003, p. 11) noting, “[t]he nature of the corporate governance problems that 
countries face varies over time and between countries. One factor of importance is ownership structure ... [which 
affects] the legal and regulatory infrastructure necessary for good corporate governance  ...”  
2 Regulatory systemic risk as contemplated in this article results from a distortion introduced by regulation into the 
regulatory framework in cases where the foundation underlying regulatory initiatives is inconsistent with market 
realities and, as a result, such regulatory initiatives do not adequately address the needs of the subject of the 
regulation. As such, regulatory systemic risk may result in structural imbalances that may, in turn, translate into 
reduced investor protection.  
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systems analysis to describe the dynamics within the US equity markets.  The purpose, more 
specifically, is to suggest that Pichhadze’s observation, vis-à-vis the MOBM, is the result of 
unfolding autopoietic and homeostatic processes within these markets when viewed 
holistically and as a system.  As such, the gravitation towards the MOBM is not random but 
rather the result of the markets’ evolution towards an efficient and stable framework, which 
allows these markets to carry out their functions.  Moreover, it is suggested that the MOBM 
represents the system’s realization of the first-best governance framework by allowing the 
system to accomplish its dual functions of risk allocation and governance.  This is in contrast 
to the existing equity ownership models that promote a realization of one function at the 
expense of the other.  
Part 4 highlights the significance of observing this important trend towards the 
MOBM from a policy perspective. As the discussion highlights, the failure to take note of the 
trend poses the risk of introducing a regulatory systemic risk into the financial system. Part 5 
will offer some concluding remarks.  
2 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 
Systems theory3 has been applied to describe and explain the nature of different types of 
systems, including living organisms, social organizations, and mechanical artefacts.  Its 
application reveals that all systems share several core features.  First, a system performs some 
function(s). Second, the system possesses the mechanisms required for achieving/performing 
its function(s), and these mechanisms can evolve over time. Third, the sustainability of the 
system is dependent on its ability to carry out its function(s) in a consistent and stable manner 
over time, which requires the sustainment/maintenance of a constant framework for the 
mechanisms by which it operates. 
The achievement of internal stability and consistency can be complicated and 
challenged by influences that may either be external or internal to the system.  Thus, while a 
system is closed to the extent that it seeks to preserve its internal integrity (i.e., the 
framework by which it performs functions), it is open and vulnerable to influences from other 
systems and even changes within its own environment. 
As the system observes changes to, and instability in, its structural framework (be it 
due to internal or external factors), the system determines whether, and how, to respond. The 
system may decide to adapt to the change and evolve. It may do so through the process of 
self-reproduction (autopoiesis)4, whereby it evolves based on its existing framework. 
Alternatively, it may decide to preserve the status quo, and will apply its self-regulatory 
mechanisms (homeostasis) to restore its normal condition (Cannon 1932, p. 24). As the 
system evolves over time, autopoiesis and homeostasis work harmoniously to achieve 
evolutionary improvements in the system while maintaining the stability and integrity of the 
system as a whole (Cannon 1932; Shkliarevsky 2007, p. 331). The following examples 
3 For a definition of systems theory see, e.g., Audi (1999). 
4 Autopoiesis has its origins in theories of the evolution of cells. There we observe that cells, although evolved and 
differentiated, communicate with one another to form a complex system of networks. Luhmann (2004)) applied 
this to the study of social systems and interactions, where each system (e.g., legal, political, etc.) is likened to a 
cell that communicates with other systems. Such communication, however, is drawn on existing forms of 
communication, and must be internalized by each system and be benchmarked against each system’s existing 
base knowledge. At that point, the respective systems make a decision whether, and how, to respond to such 
communications. Some interactions will lead an individual system to effect changes within its system in 
response to the communication. Other interactions will be less successful. Autopoiesis, then, is a self-referencing 
mechanism. See also, Maturana and  Varela (1980). 
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illustrate these mechanisms in the contexts of two systems: the human body and the legal 
system. 
2.1 The Human Body as a System (the Homeostatic Process) 
Cannon (1932) observed that there is an evolutionary development in living systems that 
affords for an internal consistency (or equilibrium) in such systems through the active 
regulation of gradients. He called the process homeostasis – a self-regulatory process that 
involves the restoration and preservation of a constant state in the body despite influences 
that may disturb the body’s equilibrium state. The sustainability of the organism is dependent 
on its ability to maintain consistency via homeostasis. Key to the homeostatic process is the 
flow of information between the different organs of the organism (i.e., autopoietic 
information).5  
The evolution of the autopoietic and homeostatic processes is a dynamic one, and 
seeks to reach an equilibrium state in the quest for stability. This involves cycles of 
development and adaptability, accompanied by cycles of instability (Shkliarevsky 2007). 
Reaching equilibrium does not mean that the system exists in a static state. Rather, once at 
that state, the organism will seek to maintain it by responding to disruptions to the 
equilibrium. That is, the maintenance of the equilibrium is a dynamic process. The 
maintenance of equilibrium is achieved through the process of feedback control.6 
Human homeostasis is illustrated by the body’s need to preserve its temperature. 
Normal body temperature fluctuates around 36.8° Celsius (Mackowiak, Wasserman and 
Levine 1992) – a value controlled by the brain. This value, however, is not universal. For 
example, it varies with (i) the site of measurement and gender (Sund-Levander, Forsberg and 
Wahren 2002), (ii) age (Günes and Zaybak 2008), (iii) race (Günes and Zaybak 2008), (iv) 
levels of physical activity (McGann et al. 1993), and (v) time of day measurement is taken 
(Mackowiak, Wasserman and Levine 1992). Other variables that influence body temperature 
include such things as hormones, exposure, and disease. 
Information about the variables leading to fluctuations in the body’s temperature is 
communicated from different organs (or sub-systems) in the body to the brain by the 
bloodstream. The brain, in turn, determines the best course of action for returning body 
temperature to the homeostatic plateau (i.e., the range between high and low body 
temperature levels). As either of the extremes is approached, corrective action (through a 
process called negative feedback) returns the system to the normal range (Homeostasis 2010). 
Thus, we have varieties of “normal” body temperature that display, on average, a mean 
temperature of a certain value, with a given range of homeostatic plateaus depending on any 
given number of conditions. 
2.2 The Legal System (the Autopoietic Process) 
As Luhmann (2004) and Teubner (1993) observed, legal institutions and the laws they 
produce also operate as a system. A legal system is formed by the State to serve particular 
functions, such as the regulation of human behaviour, in particular contexts. To achieve its 
                                                 
5 Of importance to our purposes, Cannon (1932, pp. 304-305) suggested that homeostasis may also have 
applications in areas other than the field of biology so that “an examination of the self-righting methods 
employed in the more complex living beings may offer hints for improving and perfecting the methods which 
still operate ineffectively and unsatisfactorily.” 
6 “Feedback” is a response within a system that influences the continued activity or productivity of that system. It 
is the control of a biological reaction by the end products of that reaction (Homeostasis 2010). 
4 
 
functions, the legal system possesses particular mechanisms for the formation, reform, and 
enforcement of laws.  
Laws are meant to be consistently applied in similar situations for the legal system to 
achieve and maintain the values of fairness and justice (in contrast to the random application 
of laws). This requires, therefore, a continuity of rules and doctrines.  
Legal doctrines and rules do, of course, change and evolve in response to socio-
economic changes and demands. As Luhmann (2004, p. 258) explained, however, “it does 
not mean that the environment determines the legal system. Rather, the legal system notices 
defects only in its own devices and fixes them with its own means.” In effect, therefore, the 
legal system evolves by reproducing itself so that the system’s consistency and stability can 
be maintained.   
The legal system’s experience with the transfer pricing regime illustrates this process. 
In the early part of the 20th century, the international community, through a trans-
governmental network (the predecessor of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)), joined in efforts to coordinate national policies to deal with the 
problem of transfer pricing.7 Members of the organisation formulated the Arm’s Length 
Principle (ALP),8 which was incorporated into the national laws of the respective member 
states. The ALP is applied, predominantly, in accordance with the OECD’s Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines (TPG),9 which are a form of soft law.  
The purpose/function of the transfer pricing regime is to enable states to achieve two 
primary goals. On the one hand, the regime allows for the regulation of price setting for 
transactions between associated enterprises.10 On the other hand, it allows for the regulation 
of prices based on similar principles (i.e., the ALP and TPG) in order to minimise the risk of 
double taxation, which would otherwise arise if states apply different standards and rules.11  
It is arguable that the ALP was, largely, an adequate legal principle formulated in 
light of market practices and socio-economic realities at the time of its conception (McLure 
2006, p. 218). However, socio-economic changes and changes in market practices of multi-
national enterprises (MNEs), in particular, made the ALP’s application increasingly 
                                                 
7 For a historical discussion of the development of the transfer pricing regime see, e.g., Brian (1999). For a 
comprehensive discussion of the transfer pricing problem see, e.g., OECD (2001). 
8 In its current updated form, the ALP is set out in Article 9 of the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and 
on Capital 2005. 
9 For a general discussion of the ALP and TPG see OECD (2001). One should note that the TPG have influential 
(as oppose to legal) force only. Thus, different countries incorporate the TPG into their legal system differently. 
Some countries, such as the UK, expressly require by statute that the ALP be applied as far as possible in 
accordance with the TPG (in the UK this is set out in Paragraph 2 of Sch. 28AA of the ICTA 1988). Other 
countries, such as Canada, do not explicitly refer to the TPG by statute, but the revenue agency’s interpretation 
of the statue will provide that the Revenue will follow, as far as possible, the TPG (see, e.g., the Canada Revenue 
Agency’s Information Circular 87-2R). 
10 Regulation is deemed necessary because of the possibility that associated enterprises, carrying out cross-border 
transactions, could manipulate the tax position of the group as a whole by establishing “prices for transfers of 
products and services among related entities in a manner that shifts taxable revenues beyond the jurisdiction of 
the authorities” (Basu 2007, p. 135). 
11 The OECD explained the problem of double taxation in the following terms: “any adjustment to the transfer 
price in one jurisdiction implies that a corresponding change in another jurisdiction is appropriate. However, if 
the other jurisdiction does not agree to make a corresponding adjustment the MNE [multi-national enterprise] 
group will be taxed twice on this part of its profits” (OECD 2001, Paragraph 12, Preface). 
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complicated and unworkable.12 These led to pressures for reform, and prompted some to 
argue for a complete break from the ALP (see, e.g., Sadiq 2001). 
The OECD noticed the challenges to the ALP and the calls for reform (OECD 2005). 
The OECD, however, responded with conventional reforms that sought to preserve the well 
established ALP, but added incremental modifications as to the manner in which the ALP is 
established (as set out in the TPG) (Basu 2007, p. 260). In other words, the system 
reproduced itself (this being the autopoietic process) in order to evolve in response to socio-
economic changes and pressures, but this self-reproduction was based on the existing legal 
doctrine. In so doing, the system preserved consistency and stability in the transfer pricing 
regime. 
3 THE AUTOPOIETIC AND HOMEOSTATIC PROCESSES AT WORK IN THE US 
EQUITY MARKETS 
According to Tadesse (2004), financial markets and institutions serve two primary roles that, 
collectively, affect economic performance. These roles are the “allocation of risk capital 
through saving mobilization and risk pooling and sharing; and promotion of responsible 
governance and control through providing outside investors a variety of mechanisms for 
monitoring inside decision makers” (Tadesse 2004, p. 702). 
3.1 The mechanisms by which the system carries out its functions 
Focusing on the above functions of the capital markets, we see that these functions are carried 
out through two mechanisms: (i) the legal and regulatory regimes established by state and 
non-state institutions and (ii) self-regulation by shareholders, as a monitor and influence 
management performance.   
While equity markets, as a system, worldwide carry out the same allocation and 
governance functions, the character of the mechanisms they utilize varies.  Accordingly, we 
find that in each economy the equity markets may be subject to distinct regulatory institutions 
and laws.  In addition, with respect to the mechanism of self-regulation by investors, 
differences between markets depend on the dominant form of equity ownership.  Thus, for 
example, whereas the US and UK are said to have internalized the dispersed structure of 
equity ownership, investors in Continental Europe are said to have internalized a 
concentrated structure of equity ownership. 
As Coffee (1999) noted, the problem with these mechanisms of self-regulation, under 
the traditional analysis, has been that neither form of public firm ownership at either of the 
extremes (i.e., diffused or concentrated) is efficient and the choice of either extreme involves 
a trade-off between improved monitoring of management, on the one hand, and liquid and 
efficient markets, on the other.  
Hence, while the concentrated ownership model has the advantage of enabling equity 
owners to monitor and influence management (the governance function), its disadvantage is 
that it does not allow for sufficient liquidity in the equity markets and, as a result, it does not 
                                                 
12 These changes include, inter alia, (i) globalization ( facilitated by the advent of new technologies, which led to 
changing corporate practices and arrangements); (ii) the emergence of new technology-based industries (such as 
e-commerce); (iii) a growing importance of international trade of services and intangible products; (iv) increase 
in international trade between related parties, whose operations have become increasingly integrated, and who 
often trade services that have no comparable external market; (v) increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The relevant implications of these changes are the challenges they have been creating for application of the ALP 
(McLure 2006, p. 219-20). 
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accommodate market mechanisms such as the market for corporate control (the allocation 
function).  At the other extreme is the dispersed ownership model that has the advantage of 
facilitating liquidity and market mechanisms such as the market for corporate control (the 
allocation function), but fails to provide equity holders with sufficient control to monitor 
management since ownership is minimal and limited (the governance function). 
3.2 The move towards the market oriented blockholder model in the US 
In a recent article, Pichhadze (2010) identifies that the US equity markets have been evolving 
from concentrated ownership to “dispersed” ownership to the MOBM.  This evolutionary 
trend is overlooked by the traditional and dominant theories in both academic (Pichhadze 
2010, pp. 71-72) and regulatory13 circles, where the assumption is that the ownership pattern 
in the typical American firm is dispersed. 
The significance of the trend towards the MOBM is that it makes possible for the 
equity markets to effectively and efficiently perform their dual function of facilitating 
liquidity,14 on the one hand, and providing for enhanced monitoring of corporate managers, 
on the other.15  Moreover, the MOBM sets out conditions that facilitate market mechanisms 
such as corporate control transactions.16 
Pichhadze (2010) also identifies the national and international implications of the 
gravitation towards the MOBM.  First, at the national level in the US, awareness of this trend 
highlights the need to re-evaluate one of the core fundamental pillars of American Securities 
regulation – that the ownership pattern in that country is diffused.  Second, Pichhadze also 
identifies that other economies can be expected to follow the trend towards the MOBM.  
Consequently, if a global move towards the MOBM does materialize, this could facilitate a 
“functional convergence” of international corporate governance standards, policies, and 
regulatory approaches.  Such convergence is arguably desirable because it could facilitate, 
and better accommodate, the current and future needs of the global financial landscape. 
3.2.1 The complex environment within which the capital market system operates 
The capital markets, viewed as a system, operate within a complex environment (with 
vertical and horizontal dimensions).  It is engulfed by larger systems, such as the financial 
markets.  Themselves, they subsume smaller systems, such as the equity markets, 
corporations, and investors.  While these relationships are vertically (and horizontally) 
related, there are also systems that exist outside of this relationship, such as the legal system 
and the political system (i.e., externally related systems).  Awareness of this environment is 
critical given that other systems can, and do, affect how the capital markets operate, and such 
                                                 
13 As Sargent and Honabach (2009), for example, observed in the context of securities regulation in the US, “[t]he 
SEC’s proxy rules derive directly from the Berle-Means description of the public corporation and the belief that 
managerialism represented a threat to public shareholders.” This view still represents the working hypothesis for 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (see, e.g., Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 17 
CFR Parts 200, 232, 240, 249 and 274 [Release Nos. 33-904660089; IC-28765; File No. S7-10-09)) 
14 One may question how a blockholder ownership pattern creates liquidity in the capital markets.  To understand 
this, one should note that the emergent blockholder in the American equity markets is the institutional investor.  
Despite this the American equity markets are described in economic and financial literature as been being liquid. 
15 Coffee (1999, p. 648) introduced these two features of the polar ownership structures as tradeoffs.  Under the 
MOBM, however, these features are complements rather than tradeoffs. 
16 This is important because economies characterized as having concentrated or blockholder modes of ownership 
are generally said to have a weak market for corporate control (see, e.g., Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009; Bebchuk 
and Roe 1999; Roe 1998-1999). Control transactions and listing of shares on an exchange are two ways that 
allow firms to choose their preferred governance systems (Goergen and Renneboog 2008). 
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influences are particularly important for the understanding of the markets’ gravitation 
towards the MOBM.   
The external and internal influences, and their effects, on the US capital markets as 
well as the processes by which these markets react to such influences are described in greater 
detail below through the use of systems analysis. In doing so, the analysis assists in filling 
gaps in the literature. To meet these gaps, commentators suggested that we need to recognize 
the relevance and importance of viewing corporate governance issues within their 
sociological and transnational contexts.  Consider, for example, the following comments by 
Zumbansen (2010, p. 21), 
... in the case of corporate governance regulation, many of today’s regulatory regimes are 
irreversibly transnational and hybrid in nature. While we continue to study them through 
nationally oriented textbooks and case law, we soon learn how the rules and instruments we are 
dealing with are products of a far-reaching, fundamental transformation of the regulatory 
landscape. As corporate law is being shaped by a complex mix of public, private, state- and non-
state-based norms, principles and rules, generated, disseminated and monitored by a diverse set of 
actors and experts, even the most casual look at today’s corporate governance debates reveals two 
important aspects: one is the way in which the analysis of contemporary corporate governance 
regulation can help us become sensitive to the emerging, new framework within which corporate 
governance rules are evolving, a framework which is constituted by a combination of local and 
transnational actors and norms, connected through ‘networks’ and migrating standards.  
Similarly, Sir Cadbury (Claessens 2003, p. v) noted, 
Corporations work within a governance framework. That framework is set by law, by regulations, 
by the corporation’s own constitution, by those who own and fund them, and by the expectations 
of those they serve. The framework will differ country by country, since it owes much to history 
and culture and it involves both rules and institutions. Its effectiveness depends on its coherence 
and on the degree of reliance which can be placed on its constituent parts. The governance 
framework also changes shape and develops through time. ...  how little we know about the nature 
of these changes and how their direction might be influenced. 
3.2.2 The gravitation towards the MOBM: an unfolding of the system’s autopoietic and 
homeostatic processes 
As noted earlier, the functioning of the equity markets (when viewed as a system) is 
continuously affected by influences that are external and/or internal to them. In what follows, 
I identify a number of factors impacting the vertical and horizontal dimensions/relationships 
that have facilitated the trend towards the MOBM in the American equity markets. Before 
doing this, however, it would be useful to describe the operation of the equity markets in 
simple terms. 
We can think of the equity markets in the following way. Let us assume that equity 
investors (as a group) make up a system (O0). Assume further that the publicly traded firm is 
likened to a system (O1) that is, inter alia, made up of O0 and is subsisting within a larger 
system, such as the equity markets (O2) (which in itself is subsisting within a larger system, 
such as the capital markets (O3) and the financial system (O4) etc.). Moreover, assume that 
shares, representing equity stakes in the public firm, are the gradients subject to the 
regulatory processes within O1 and O2.17 Adopting a bird’s eye view to this system, 
Pichhadze observed an evolutionary trend in the ownership of public firms in the American 
equity markets towards the MOBM, 
                                                 
17 This is consistent with Fama’s observation that “[t]he primary role of the capital market is allocation of 
ownership of the economy’s capital stock” (Fama 1970, p. 383). 
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This trend gives rise, inter alia, to two related observations (Pichhadze 2010, pp. 82-
84). First, there appears to be a market-driven self-regulatory mechanism at the level of the 
equity markets that tends to concentrate ownership into the hands of blockholders. It is 
suggested that this is the homeostatic or self-regulatory process described above. Second, this 
self-regulatory process is supplemented and facilitated by information flows. It is suggested 
that this is the autopoietic or self-reproducing process described above. Let us consider each 
of these processes.  
3.2.2.1 The regulations of share ownership 
The history of the US equity markets shows that these markets evolved in three stages vis-à-
vis ownership patterns. During the infancy of the markets, ownership was concentrated in the 
hands of a number of industrial elites. The pattern of ownership started to change during the 
early decades of the 20th century, where we notice that the ownership pattern in large 
corporations experienced fragmentation to the extent that no single shareholder could 
influence the management of the corporation. The third stage, which started in the post World 
War II era, involved the institutionalization of the US equity markets. This process saw the 
re-concentration of ownership of the previously fragmented large firms into the hands of 
fiduciary investors that managed large pools of capital on behalf of individual investors. 
These fiduciary investors are institutional investors and include such institutions as mutual 
funds, public and private pension funds, and insurance companies (for a general discussion 
see Pichhadze 2010). 
We can describe this evolutionary trend as one that moved from concentrated 
ownership (i.e., stage one), to “dispersed” ownership (i.e., stage two), to the MOBM (i.e., 
stage three). As we can see, as the capital markets grew in complexity and matured, market 
forces have been combining the two extreme poles of ownership (i.e., concentrated and 
diffused) into a hybrid structure that affords both liquidity in the capital markets and 
increased monitoring by blockholders. This coupling of ownership structures allows for the 
functioning of market mechanisms such as the market for corporate control. 
The trend towards the MOBM can, therefore, be thought of in terms of the 
homeostatic or self-regulatory process of the equity markets vis-à-vis share ownership, which 
attempts to maintain the levels of corporate ownership within certain limits at O1 and O2 (i.e., 
the public firm and the equity markets, respectively).  These limits correspond to the 
blockholder levels of ownership and represent the state of stability towards which the markets 
are moving – levels that allow the markets to perform their dual functions of allocation and 
governance.18 This range, therefore, can be said to represent the homeostatic plateau or 
“normal” range of voting share ownership. 
What happens when a deviation from the “normal” range is detected by the system? 
The recent wave of private equity (PE) activity provides an example of this. PE transactions, 
like their 1980s counterparts, the leverage buyout (LBO) transactions, are a partnership 
between active investors and institutional investors (see, e.g., Pound 1992). As an ownership 
                                                 
18 The study by Berry, Fields and Wilkins (2006) is illustrative of this point. The study followed 109 young firms 
(defined as three years of age or younger at the time of the IPO) for a period of eleven years following the IPO. 
Their results show that governance mechanisms in the firm (which include, inter alia, CEO ownership, board 
independence, venture capitalist directors, total outside board membership, venture capitalist ownership, 
incentive-based pay, and unaffiliated block holdings) work in tandem in order to minimize agency costs that 
arise as a result from the reduction in managerial stock ownership in the post-IPO term. Thus, they found that as 
CEO and venture capitalists ownership declines after the firms in their study went public, the increase in 
monitoring by independent board membership and outside blockholders (a category that includes both 
institutional investors and individual investors) offset the potential increase in agency costs of equity. 
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model, they are said to present a superior ownership structure to the public corporations 
because they offer (i) improved corporate governance, (ii) ownership that is concentrated in 
the hands of active owners or investors (accompanied by strong managerial incentives), and 
(iii) efficient capital structure (Jensen 1989, 2007; Morgan Stanley Roundtable 2006).  
PE and LBO transactions, much like active investing, is the process of trading based 
on information – information about inefficiencies in the marketplace. These transactions, 
however, also represent the market’s response to the fragmented nature of the public 
corporations.19 Thus, when information about inefficiencies resulting from the diffusion of 
ownership is transmitted in the market, active investors participate in the takeover 
environment, provided that these investment opportunities can be translated into increased 
returns on investment. They do this by taking the ownership of the target firm to the other 
extreme – concentrated ownership – with the intention of introducing operational efficiencies 
into these firms and later returning them to the public markets by way of initial public 
offering.  
The lesson from these transactions for corporate governance, according to Elson 
(2007), is that we need blockholder representation on boards. Phrased differently, 
blockholder ownership can be thought of as representing the stable state of corporate public 
ownership. 
This analysis can be applied at the international level as well. Claessens (2003, p. 6) 
observed, in the context of corporate governance analysis, that “[a]n easier way to ask the 
question of what corporate governance means is to take the functional approach. This 
approach recognizes that financial services come in many forms, but that if the services are 
unbundled, most, if not all, key elements are similar.” We can adopt this functional approach 
to the analysis of the homeostatic plateau, which is a dynamic range and economy specific.  
While the particular value of the homeostatic plateau for any given economy may 
depend on any number of variables, much like the thermodynamic regulation above, the 
process will result in a number of “normal” ranges that, while economy specific, should yield 
similar results.20 As such, it is submitted that the MOBM can accommodate a variety of 
economic structures (or varieties of capitalism).  
In addition, the fact that the MOBM is the emerging ownership pattern in the US 
shows us that market forces in the US are driving ownership patterns towards what can be 
said to be an optimal ownership structure that is also socially most favourable or optimal. 
Social optimality in the context of the corporation refers to the notion that the 
shareholders’ representatives serve the shareholders’ interest (Grossman and Hart 1980). One 
                                                 
19 As Pound (1992, p. 8) observed, “[o]versight by entrepreneurial insurgent investors has been generated by two 
central (and related) features of U.S. capital markets: their fragmentation and their openness to innovation.”  
20 To use the terminology of the thermodynamic example above, economies may differ based on their  (i) gender, 
i.e., type of legal system (e.g., Common Law vs. Continental Law); (ii) race, i.e., geographic location (e.g., 
Europe vs. North America vs. Asia-Pacific); (iii) age, i.e., stage of economic development (e.g., emerging vs. 
developing vs. developed); and (iv) level of physical activity, i.e., state of economy (e.g., expansionary vs. 
recessionary periods). Yet, much like the thermodynamic homeostatic plateau, the market will attempt to restore 
the levels of ownership to ownership homeostatic plateau once a disturbance is communicated. Disturbance in 
this case translates into a deviation from the economy specific range of block holdings towards either extreme 
form of ownership (i.e., diffused or concentrated).  The assumes a frictionless process, where friction in this 
context means political and/or other influences that may serve to act as an obstacle to the self-regulatory process. 
Roe (1997, p. 8) provide an example of how the political system can serve as friction to the process. He 
observed, in the context of the US, that “[p]olitics, in the form of laws and regulations ... played a key role in 
fragmenting stock ownership beyond what was required” [emphasis added]. 
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way of ensuring that this social welfare is met in the context of the corporation is through the 
monitoring of managers. The problem is that absent anyone owning sufficient stakes in the 
corporation, monitoring is left to market-mechanisms such as takeovers (Grossman and Hart 
1980). Market forces and socio-economic realities, however, created a venue for the 
promotion of social optimality in the corporation. They have paved the way for the re-
concentration of equity ownership into the hands of institutional investors, who have 
sufficient stake in the corporation and, therefore, an interest in monitoring corporate 
managers.  
Institutional investors, as blockholders, and takeovers are also two key features in the 
MOBM. They promote efficiency and liquidity in the capital markets while enabling the 
increased monitoring of corporate managers. In addition, given that a feature of the MOBM is 
the presence of a blockholder (whether an institutional or not), it points to the observation 
that market forces, in gravitating towards the MOBM, are attempting to reduce the sub-
optimality created by the diffused ownership pattern of corporate ownership.21 
 
3.2.2.2 The role of information at the inter-system level 
Activity in the capital markets is also influenced by information other than that which exists 
at the intra-system level (e.g., information about shares and companies as described above). 
This information is that which operates at the inter-systems level – that is, information 
between the capital markets and other systems (such as the legal system and the political 
system) that influence, and are influenced by, the markets. The need for understanding this 
relationship was expressed by Claessens (2003, p. 6), 
Institutions do not arise in a vacuum and are affected by the rules in the country or the world. 
Similarly, laws and rules are affected by the country’s institutional setup. In the end, both 
institutions and rules are endogenous to other factors and conditions in the country. Among these, 
ownership structures and the role of the state matter for the evolution of institutions and rules 
through the political economy process. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 738) [referring to Andrei 
Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, 52 Journal of Finance 2, 1997, 
737] take a dynamic perspective by stating: “Corporate governance mechanisms are economic and 
legal institutions that can be altered through political process.” This dynamic aspect is very 
relevant in a cross-country review, but has received much less attention from researchers to date. 
The inter-systems type of information supported the growth and maturity of the equity 
markets and involved the gradual and progressive internalization of input in order for the 
framework, within which the capital markets operate, to achieve stability. Stability here is 
achieved through the continuous monitoring by the system of the changes to its environment, 
and the making of updates or corrections to its framework in order to respond to changing 
socio-economic conditions. This information had to be benchmarked against prior knowledge 
of the actors in order to facilitate growth towards the MOBM. This is the self-reproducing 
(autopoietic) process that supplements and facilitates the self-regulatory (homeostatic) 
process in the capital markets just described.  
A number of examples will illustrate how the autopoietic process in the US facilitated 
the concentration of equity ownership into the hands of institutional investors and, therefore, 
the progress towards the MOBM. The first example is that of The Employee Retirement 
                                                 
21 As Bebchuk and Zingales (2000, p. 57) observed, “the incidence of IPOs ... is larger in the United States than in 
other advanced economies ... While this large incidence of IPOs is generally taken to be a socially optimal 
outcome, our results suggest the possibility that this incidence is excessive” [emphasis added]. The assumption in 
the Bebchuk and Zingales analysis appears to be that going public automatically translates into the assumption of 
diffused ownership structure for the corporation (i.e., atomistic share ownership). 
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Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The US government, through Congress, observed a 
dramatic shift in the character of share ownership in the US. This shift was from individual 
ownership of stock to institutional ownership of stock.22 Given the socio-economic impact of 
this shift in share ownership, the US government adopted measures to facilitate it. One such 
measure is The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) – a US federal 
statute that sets minimum standards for most voluntarily established pension and health plans.  
In this context, it was observed, that the dramatic shift in share ownership “has not 
been the creation of the Congress, and certainly not the SEC, but rather of other economic 
and social forces ... although Congress has from time-to-time stimulated the move towards 
increased institutionalization of equity investment through various income tax provisions, as 
it did just recently with the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974” (Garrett 
1975). Through ERISA, the US government also endorsed shareholder activism by pension 
funds – that is, the political system facilitated the corporate governance function by certain 
actors in the equity markets through the tools of policy. This was done through the 
Department of Labor’s observation that shareholder activism by fiduciaries of portfolio firms 
is consistent with their fiduciary obligations.23 
The ERISA example provides an illustration for the situation where the political 
system observes a trend within the economy (i.e., the institutionalization of the equity 
markets) and decides to accommodate it by updating the legal framework for the purpose of 
further facilitating the trend.  
The second example illustrates how the legal system responded to interest group 
pressures by updating the legal framework in order to accommodate the new reality of 
institutional investors as blockholders. Involves the proxy rules in the US.  The proxy rules 
found in section 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are intended to protect fair 
voting in the corporation (Bloomenthal and Wolff 2008). As the size and role of institutional 
investors in the equity markets grew, some institutional investors, led by the California Public 
Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), criticized the proxy rules for impeding fuller 
shareholder participation in corporate affairs and, as a result, sought that the SEC amend the 
rules. In their argument for these amendments CalPERS argued that the rules “discourage 
responsible, long-term investors from playing a meaningful role in the governments of public 
corporations” (Bloomenthal and Wolff 2008).24  
The dialogue between the SEC and institutional investors in the area of proxy rules25 
reflects, as in the ALP example provided above, the result of information exchange between 
                                                 
22 For more on the process of the institutionalization of the US equity markets see Pichhadze (2010, p. 73-79). 
23 29 CFR 2509.94-2 - Interpretive bulletin relating to written statements of investment policy, including proxy 
voting policy or guidelines (available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/allcfr/Title_29/Part_2509/29CFR2509.94-
2.htm) (date accessed, February 1, 2010). 
24 It is interesting to note that in their arguments for amending the proxy rules, CalPERS argued the significance of 
long-term investment horizon of institutional investors. This is of note given that it has been argued that 
‘[i]nstitutional investors have never been the paragons of long-term investing that some claim to be’ (Jacoby 
2008, p. 24). See also Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001).  
25 Sargent and Honabach (2009) observed, inter alia, that since the late 1980s, institutional investors, under the 
leadership of such actors as CalPERS, sought to amend the proxy rules in order to achieve three objectives: (i) to 
protect the market for corporate control by removing anti-takeover measures adopted by managements and 
boards; (ii) to increase shareholder input into corporate decision-making; and (iii) to influence the election of 
corporate boards). According to Sargent and Honabach, institutional investors have been successful in their 
efforts to influence the SEC and US Congress in amending the proxy rules to facilitate the first of two of these 
goals. The third objective is currently in the proposal stages (i.e., Facilitating Shareholder Director 
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the market (and its participants) and the SEC (or the legal system). Here, the SEC was faced 
with challenges to the proxy rules stemming from the changing socio-economic landscape of 
the equity markets (i.e., the institutionalization of the financial markets and the re-
concentration of equity ownership in institutional investors). The SEC responded to these 
challenges by amending its rules based on its own framework. 26  
This example illustrates how the legal system responded to interest group pressures by 
updating the legal framework in order to accommodate the new reality of institutional 
investors as blockholders. 
4 UNFOLDING ... BUT NOT YET A COMPLETED PROCESS 
At the outset of this article, it was noted the move towards a first-best corporate model is 
being unfolded. As the discussion showed, with the emergence of institutional investors as an 
influential blockholder in large public firms, the US markets have been gravitating towards 
the MOBM. This process, however, is not yet complete.  
The reason is rooted in the legal system’s failure to update some its definitions. More 
particularly, actors in the capital markets have recognized the growing role and importance of 
institutional investors in the capital markets qua blockholders, both nationally and 
internationally. Nevertheless, the legal system, though facilitating this important development 
and taking note of it, has not yet updated its basic definitions to acknowledge this process.  
Evidence of the sluggishness in updating the basic definitions can be found in 
American securities regulation. While blockholders are a feature of the US capital markets, in 
firms of all sizes (Pichhadze 2010), the underlying premise of US securities regulation is that 
the ownership pattern in the US is one that is properly characterized as diffused (Pichhadze 
2010, p. 88). This creates a difficulty for policy making considering different ownership 
structures (whether diffused, concentrated, or blockholder) create different opportunities for 
policy making. Those different opportunities, however, require different policy 
considerations (Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009).  
 
Consequently, by (i) failing to recognize that the appropriate ownership model in the 
US is in fact the MOBM and (ii) continuing to promote policy and regulatory initiatives that 
are premised on the (invalid) notion that the ownership pattern in the US is diffused, there is 
the risk that a distortion is being introduced into the regulatory system by in appropriately 
applying the same regulatory system to two ownership patterns (i.e., MOBM and dispersed). 
Phrased differently, by failing to make a proper diagnosis of a symptom, we are offering 
inappropriate treatment. In the context of the capital markets and policy making, approaches 
to corporate governance policy based on inappropriate foundations may result in policy 
makers inadvertently contributing to the introduction of a systemic risk into the national, as 
well as, the international financial systems.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Nominations, 17 CFR Parts 200, 232, 240, 249 and 274 [Release Nos. 33-904660089; IC-28765; File No. S7-10-
09]). 
26 A similar example for the autopoietic process, where the political and legal systems observe and update their 
framework due to changing socio-economic changes in the economy vis-à-vis institutional investors, can be 
found in the UK. There it was observed that given the institutionalization of the UK markets, “a regulatory 
structure which reflects the interests of institutional shareholders, protecting them against both managerial 
entrenchment and acquirer opportunism is perhaps a natural growth” (Davies and Hopt 2004, p.  190). 
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The type of systemic risk I am referring to in this context results from long-term 
imbalances introduced into the regulatory framework by regulators. What does “imbalance” 
mean in the context of systemic risk in the capital markets? Schapiro (2009) noted that we 
need to distinguish between two types of systemic risk. First, there is the near-term systemic 
risk that results from seizures or cascading failures. Second, there is the longer-term risk that 
results from the unintentional bias towards larger institutions at the expense of smaller 
participants. Consequently, Schapiro (2009) noted, “[w]e must be very careful that our efforts 
to protect the system from near-term systemic seizures do not inadvertently result in a long-
term systemic imbalance.” In addition, Schapiro (2009) noted that in the context of these 
types of systemic risk we need to, inter alia, “address structural imbalances that facilitate the 
development of systemic risk by closing gaps in regulations …” To adequately meet such 
challenges, however, we must first observe the regulatory gaps currently embedded in the 
system. 
As we have seen with the examples mentioned above, it is in the context of corporate 
governance that we see examples of the seeds of structural imbalance in the overall 
regulatory framework of securities regulation. These imbalances are capable of translating 
themselves into a regulatory systemic risk if ignored by policy makers. These imbalances 
result from the introduction, and carrying forward, of distortions into the regulatory 
framework. Moreover, a student of the area will be aware that these distortions, and the 
imbalance they may give rise to, extend beyond the proxy rules and affect other aspects of the 
regulatory framework. This is because corporate ownership within a given economy touches 
on a number of key governance arrangements27 and impacts the overall regulatory framework 
of securities regulation.  
Consequently, the observation vis-à-vis changing investor demographics (i.e., the 
growing size of institutional holdings and the diminishing size of individual holdings) and the 
realization that the MOBM accurately portrays the ownership pattern in the American equity 
markets, have broad implications to the regulatory framework applicable to these markets. 
Ignoring these distortions might give rise to regulatory systemic risk. 
These distortions assume greater complexity when we move from the national arena 
to the international and transnational settings. Here, it has been noted that “[i]n its broadest 
sense, corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals and between individuals and communal goals. ... The aim is to align as nearly as 
possible the interests of individuals, of corporations, and of society” (Claessens 2003, p. vii). 
One way of achieving these goals is through the promotion of international corporate 
governance standards – standards that started as national codes and later became international 
guidelines (Claessens 2003, p. vii). Key players in the promotion of these standards are 
institutional investors (Claessens 2003, pp. v-vi). 
Institutional investors are instrumental in the introduction of codes of corporate 
governance. Following the production of these codes of best corporate governance practices, 
they promote their adoption by their portfolio firms. Institutional investors are also relied 
                                                 
27 For example, ownership structures affect several key governance arrangements and, as such, the regulatory 
framework that defines and affects them. For example, it has been observed that ownership structures affect 
arrangements such as “those regulating control contests, voting procedures, the allocation of power between 
directors and shareholders, the distribution of power among shareholders ... director independence, and corporate 
transactions that may divert value to insiders” (Bebchuk & Hamdani 2009, p. 1270). In addition, it has been 
observed that ownership structure affects such matters as (i) takeovers and defensive measures adopted by firms 
to thwart such activity, (ii) conflict of interest rules and related party rules, and (iii) significant corporate action 
and disclosure rules (Kraakman et al. 2004). 
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upon by governmental agencies for the adoption and introduction of codes recommended by 
these governmental agencies to institutional investors’ portfolio firms (Mallin 2007, pp. 82-
85). Thus, as Zumbansen (2010, p. 21) observed, corporate governance regulation can be 
seen as “transnational and hybrid in nature.” This reliance on institutional investors poses a 
definitional or characterization challenge to policy making. 
The definitional challenge posed by institutional investors stems from their treatment 
in the literature. Generally speaking, institutional investors are credited for, and trusted with, 
the promotion of corporate governance standards both nationally and internationally 
(Cadbury 2003).28 Leading these efforts are, among others, American institutional investors 
who are said to promote US-style governance around the globe (Gilson 2004, p. 147). In 
addition, institutional investors are also credited with the reduction of public distrust in large 
firms (Stimson 1925, pp. 135-136).29 As an article in one of the United Nations Environment 
Programme Finance Initiative’s (UNEP FI) newsletters notes, 
Policymakers around the world have a historic window of opportunity to shepherd a new policy of 
growth that transcends outmoded divides between at the anti-capitalism of the traditional left and 
the laissez-faire corporatism of the traditional right.  The reason is the rise of mass ownership. 
Through pension, insurance and savings institutions, millions of citizens-savers are gradually 
inheriting potent stakes in the commanding heights of enterprise ... (Davis 2005, p. 8) 
Yet, while professing to, inter alia, promote dispersed ownership (i.e., US-style 
governance), the MOBM analysis, in this article and in Pichhadze (2010), has demonstrated 
that institutional investors are the new blockholder in the American equity markets.  
The two conflicting ways to characterize or define the role of institutional investors in 
the equity markets (i.e., as agents for the diffusion ownership that are relied upon for the 
introduction and dissemination of improved corporate governance standards, on the one hand, 
and as financial blockholders in public firms, on the other) present a challenge for 
policymaking. This challenge also represents the point where economic analysis and legal 
analysis yield different results and, thus, depart from one another. 
From an economic analysis perspective, whether we view them as blockholders or 
agents for the diffusion of ownership, institutional investors, as a powerful financial actor in 
the capital markets, offer a potential vehicle for the improvement of corporate governance 
practices. That is, institutional investors, as blockholders and transnational agents, possess the 
power to introduce the requisite change at both the national and international levels. Yet, this 
change may give rise to a potential conflict.  
The conflict could stem from the source of the change. Namely, whether the source of 
change being the institutional investor or the State. If the proposed change originates with the 
institutional investor, it does not automatically imply that this proposed change is for the 
benefit of all the shareholders of the corporation, as the interests of the institutional investors 
are not necessarily identical to those of other shareholders. If, on the other hand, the change 
originates from the State, the State may need to rely on the institutional investor to enforce 
                                                 
28 See Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) noting, at 49-50, that institutional investors, in general, and mutual funds 
and pension funds, in particular, “not only give effective voice to shareholder interest, but promote in particular 
the interests of dispersed public shareholders rather than those of controlling shareholders or corporate insiders.... 
Moreover, the new activist shareholder-oriented institutions are today acting increasingly on an international 
scale.”). 
29 If that was the case, the reduction in distrust was apparently accompanied by (i) a retraction from laissez faire 
economic principles and (ii) increased governmental and political influences on commercial activities (Pell 
1925). 
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compliance by portfolio firms with the proposed change. When the State does this, it does so 
based on the notion that the institutional investor is a powerful and influential blockholder in 
the markets.  
While there may not be conflict per se in the reliance of the State on the institutional 
investor qua blockholder, it does lead us to question the fundamental assumption of the 
ownership pattern being dispersed under corporate and securities laws in countries such as 
the US. Such questioning of fundamental assumptions, in turn, leads to the need for revisiting 
the regulatory framework, as noted earlier, for the purposes of updating its definitions in 
order to give effect to the fact that the ownership pattern is the MOBM. 
5 CONCLUSION 
This article sought to show how market forces are driving an evolutionary trend towards the 
MOBM, which represents a first-best corporate governance solution, by actively combining 
two extreme forms of ownership (concentrated and diffused) into a hybrid ownership 
structure that affords both increased monitoring of management and the promotion of 
efficient and liquid markets. We arrive at the MOBM by adopting a holistic view of the 
capital markets and the use of sociological methodologies. As the analysis showed the trend 
towards the MOBM was facilitated by information and two types of processes: the 
homeostatic process and the autopoietic process.  
This type of analysis also reveals that progress towards the MOBM has been 
unfolding but it is not yet complete. This is due to the fact that the legal system has not, yet, 
updated its basic definitions – definitions that are required to be updated in order to facilitate 
stability in the system’s framework. Stability also translates into the minimization  of the 
potential to introduce a systemic risk secondary to the current inability of policy makers to 
take notice of trends in the markets that they regulate. 
Taking notice of the MOBM trend by regulators and policy makers has national and 
international implications. Such regulatory recognition by policymakers should yield, at least, 
two results. First, it would facilitate an update of the regulatory framework of the securities 
markets so that policies will meet the challenges presented by the blockholder mode of 
ownership. In addition, given that the US is a special case of the blockholder mode of 
ownership – the MOBM – traditional analysis of the blockholder model needs to be tailored 
to that situation, as opposed to relying on approaches currently available in academic and 
regulatory circles. This is because the traditional analysis does not necessarily accommodate 
the MOBM. For instance, the traditional analysis holds that that the blockholder ownership 
pattern does not allow for market mechanisms such as the market for corporate control, 
whereas, under the MOBM analysis, the blockholder mode of ownership in the US relies 
upon market mechanisms for the maintenance of the homeostatic plateau in the ownership of 
the public firm. 
Internationally, the MOBM facilitates a functional convergence on corporate 
governance issues given that the MOBM aligns the US more closely with other economies – 
economies that are in the process of adopting measures for the introduction of market 
oriented instruments into their respective markets so as to move closer to the US. Such a 
functional convergence may facilitate the harmonization of corporate governance standards 
internationally. However, the realization of a globally harmonized approach to corporate 
governance necessitates policy makers to recognize the evolving trends in the global 
marketplace so that the measures they adopt do in fact reduce the systemic risk in their 
respective markets rather than propagate them.  
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This article is timely and relevant in the context of the 21st century’s first post-
economic crisis era. Recent events in the global financial sector have resulted in heightened 
public and regulatory interest in increased regulation of the financial markets and the 
extension of regulation into new areas (Expert Panel, 2009: 11; Schapiro, 2009). While much 
of the discourse on the issue nowadays relates to financial intermediaries (e.g., investment 
houses) and certain financial products (e.g., over-the-counter derivatives) that could introduce 
or enhance systemic risk in the capital markets, imbalance in the regulatory framework could 
be induced in other areas (i.e., regulations that do not mirror neatly the realities in the 
marketplace).  
I highlighted the need for regulators to be cognizant of long-term trends in the capital 
markets in order to minimize the possibility of regulators introducing a system risk into the 
markets (i.e., regulatory systemic risk). Such a cautionary approach is mandated in order to 
avoid (i) the introduction of distortions into the novel financial framework contemplated by 
policymakers and/or (ii) the elimination of existing distortions should this novel framework 
be premised on the existing one. 
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